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Abstract 
My paper will assess the effects that decolonization and communism had on Ethiopia and 
Cuba during the Cold War. The lasting impacts such concepts had on both countries after the 
Cold War and into the present day will also be examined. It may be interesting to contemplate 
that both Ethiopia and Cuba were third-world countries that transitioned into communist 
nations during the Cold War, but, after the end of the Cold War, only Cuba kept its communist 
government. Ethiopia was the only non-colonized country in the continent of Africa. Instead 
of being controlled by outside European nations, Ethiopia was ruled by a monarch for six 
hundred years. However, in the 1970s, the country was weakened by political in-fighting. In 
order to restore public confidence and unity, Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu seized power in a 
military coup and transformed the country into a communist state. As of today, Ethiopia has 
a formally democratic political system with a federal republic. On the other hand, Cuba had 
been colonized by the Spanish from the 15th century until the Spanish-American War in the 
19th century. In 1959, its US-backed President, Fulgencio Batista, was ousted during the 
Cuban Revolution leaving the country in the hands of Fidel Castro. Since then, Cuba has 
been a one-party state under communist rule. Castro would utilize his party to exercise 
control over all aspects of Cuban life. Through my paper, I will research why out of these 
two third-world countries with similar desires to unify their nations under communism only 
Cuba remained a communist nation in the 21st century.   
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Introduction 
During the Cold War, two Third World countries transitioned into communist nations in 
order to unify their people. Ethiopia and Cuba both adopted communist governments in an 
attempt to bring social order and prosperity to their nations. However, after the Cold War, 
only Cuba kept its communist government. Within this paper, I will be examining the impacts 
that socialist concepts had on both countries throughout the Cold War, and the differences 
between both countries’ political developments. The reason why I am researching this topic 
is because I found it interesting to examine why, after both Ethiopia and Cuba transitioned 
into communist nations during the Cold War, afterwards only Cuba kept its communist 
government in the 21st century.  
In the 1970s, Ethiopia’s government had been weakened by political in-fighting. In 
order to restore public confidence and national unity, First Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu 
Haile Mariam seized power in a military coup and transformed the country into a communist 
state. In 1959, Cuba’s US-backed President, Fulgencio Batista, was ousted during the Cuban 
Revolution, leaving the country in the hands of Fidel Castro. Under Castro’s rule, the 
country’s communist party exercised control over all aspects of Cuban life. Both cases thus 
saw the overthrow of government by communist-led groups. However, Ethiopia’s communist 
government ultimately did not last. As of today, the country has a formally democratic 
political system with a federal republic. In contrast, Cuba has remained a one-party state 
under communist rule. This paper will utilize research in order to answer the question of how 
two Third World countries with similar desires to unify their nations adapted to communism 
and why Cuba remained a communist nation in the 21st century while Ethiopia did not. 
 
Analysis 
When analyzing the governmental shifts of both Ethiopia and Cuba during the Cold War, we 
have to first understand the major global influences of that era. In its simplest form, the Cold 
War consisted of a state of geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union with its satellite 
states and the United States with its Western allies after the end of World War II. With most 
of the world recovering from the devastation of the war, these two super powers had emerged 
to influence the meaning of social and political modernity. Various scholars have utilized the 
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Cold War as a starting point to discuss the nature of globalization around the world. In his 
book, The Global Cold War, author Odd Arne Westad argued that the US and Soviet 
interventionism had shaped both the international and the domestic framework within which 
political and cultural changes in Third World countries took place. Westad further explained 
that the Third World elites often framed their own political agendas into conscious responses 
to the models of development presented by the two main contenders of the Cold War, the 
United States and the Soviet Union.2 It can be said that both Ethiopia and Cuba had been 
influenced by the major political ideologies of the Cold War and both had relied on such 
beliefs to modernize and stabilize their countries. 
 In order to further examine the developments in both countries, this paper will utilize 
concepts of comparative history. Comparison and generalization from comparison are basic 
analytical techniques within the social sciences and may be used to the end of dislodging 
exceptionalist, Eurocentric, or other restrictive assumptions.3 Some scholars have argued that 
there are significant differences between comparative history and world history. Michael 
Adas, a student of Philip Curtin’s Wisconsin comparative history program in the late 1960s, 
offered a description of a comparative analytical approach. He theorized that the difference 
between world history, or what he had termed the “grand narrative,” and comparative history 
was that in the case of the former one traced key themes and processes in a broad global 
perspective, while the other promoted a method of historical analysis that had been developed 
by travelers in other social science disciplines.4 Serious comparative analysis in historical 
writing involved choosing a world historical process, pattern, or theme worthy of 
investigation, and then selecting a limited set of relevant cases for detailed systematic study. 
In this case, it would be examining the political transition of Ethiopia and Cuba into 
communist states, and understanding the lasting impact that such transitions had around the 
globe. In contrast, Patrick Manning, another student from the Wisconsin program two years 
ahead of Adas, argued that comparison is a specific analytical strategy rather than a field of 
 
2 Odd Arne Westad. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, (New 
York: Cambridge University Press 2005), 3. 
3 Ross E. Dunn, Laura J. Michell, and Kerry Ward, ed. The New World History: A Field Guide for Teachers 
and Researchers, (Oakland: University of California Press 2016), 332. 
4 Michael Adas discussing his Comparative History theory found in The New World History: A Field Guide for 
Teachers and Researchers, (Oakland: University of California Press 2016), 333. 
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history.5  By understanding comparisons in this way, we can see them as similar to other 
analytical strategies such as the quest to understand connections between historical 
phenomena or the proper chronological sequencing of developments. This would be similar 
to researching what led up to the political shifts of Ethiopia and Cuba in order to find out 
their lasting impacts. 
Whatever the case, through these new concepts of comparative history, the scope of 
interest of historical studies had been widened with a view to perceiving and explaining 
differences in cultural history and world history. As University of Chicago Professor Kenneth 
Pomeranz suggested, present-day studies now highlight the importance of long-distance 
relationships in the formation of all regions of the world, not just Europe.6 After World War 
II, new knowledge of Asia, Africa, and Latin America had rapidly accumulated. Professor of 
Modern European History at UCLA, Lynn Hunt, argued in her book, Writing History in the 
Global Era, that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had allowed 
globalization to fill an ideological vacuum.7 She went on by claiming that globalization 
explained the fall of the Soviet Union as its state-directed industries could not compete in the 
electronic global economy that emerged in the 1980s. However, when Hunt tried to explain 
that communism collapsed due to the amount of contradictions within Marxist theorem, she 
revealed her Western understandings and biases toward Socialist ideology. Hunt was right 
when stating that “most global histories are transnational or comparative,”8 and that the Cold 
War brought about “new concepts around globalization and comparative history.” Still, much 
of her argument expressed that ideas of exceptionalism, or Eurocentrism, remained within 
the field of history and social sciences even after the Cold War. In order to understand the 
global impacts of the Cold War, we will have to first consider the different global histories 
that had developed directly from this tension-filled political era.         
 When comprehending Cold War global political transitions in a historical sense, we 
can refer to the works of scholars Sebastian Conrad and Pamela Kyle Crossley. According to 
Sebastian Conrad, in his book What is Global History (2016), the Cold War had ushered in 
 
5 Patrick Manning’s argument regarding comparison found in, The New World History: A Field Guide for 
Teachers and Researchers, (Oakland: University of California Press 2016) 333. 
6 Kenneth Pomeranz discussion on globalization concepts found in The New World History: A Field Guide for 
Teachers and Researchers, (Oakland: University of California Press 2016), 347. 
7 Lynn Hunt. Writing History in the Global Era, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company 2014), 46. 
8 Hunt, Writing History in the Global Era, 63. 
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new global histories that seemed to cover everything around the world. In connection to the 
study of Ethiopia and Cuba’s political developments, global history of the Cold War allows 
for the analysis of both countries on a world stage,9 helping to break away from a strictly 
European perspective to instead focus on an African and Latin American perspective. After 
the Cold War, the concepts of globalization and civilization began to emerge as Third World 
countries broke away from systems of colonization to form new independent nations. Old 
Eurocentric approaches to history had been reversed by new diverse concepts around 
civilizations such as Afrocentricity or Sinocentrism.10 However, some historians preferred 
transnational historiography as opposed to the term “global,” since the approach could easily 
be used as an imperialists discourse under a Western imposition. This is how we get a pattern 
of, “indigenous responses to the Western challenges,” included within the study of Latin 
America and the West as well as Africa and Imperialism.11 This paper will strive to avoid 
such misconceptions in order to present a more neutral analysis.  
 In reviewing the dominant political ideologies of capitalism and communism, 
Crossley explained that through modernization all cultures will eventually converge. The 
division between “capitalist” and “communist” systems would be overcome by the 
homogenizing effects of living in industrialized societies.12 This would explain how Ethiopia 
could transition from a monarchy to a communist state to a federal republic in short time. 
However, this would not be true in the case of Cuba as the process of merging cultures and 
ideologies had notably stalled after the country’s transformation into a communist state. Both 
Ethiopia and Cuba desired to modernize their countries through the transition of culture and 
political ideologies, yet Cuba continued to stabilize its country under a communist-led 
government into the 21st century. To find out why, we have to go deeper into the global 
histories of both countries. 
 After centuries of being controlled by foreign powers, the island of Cuba experienced 
a political revolution that put control of the country into the hands of the Cuban Communist 
Party. Cuba’s revolution would inspire a range of left-wing states and movements within 
 
9 Sebastian Conrad. What is Global History? (Oxford: Princeton University Press 2016), 117. 
10 Conrad, What is Global History?, 176. 
11 Ibid, 218. 
12 Crossley, What is Global History?, 65. 
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Third World nations, including the Ethiopian Revolution.13 For the Soviets, three aspects had 
dominated their thinking regarding the Third World in the 1960s. They were concerned about 
Chinese influence after the Sino-Soviet split, they had reevaluated the party’s views on the 
potential for socialist revolution in the Third World, and they were impressed, but also 
irritated, by Cuba’s willingness to confront the US. In the United States, the rising communist 
movements within the Third World caused US policymakers to give certain regions more 
attention. After becoming militarily involved in the Vietnamese civil war from 1964 
onwards, Washington gained a sense of immediate danger in regard to Third World 
developments, and especially toward the developments in Cuba. The revolution itself within 
the country was meant to inspire radicals all over the Third World. It had begun as a nativist 
rebellion against foreign influence, but gradually it had transitioned into a Marxist 
experiment.14 Fidel Castro had left the regime of President Fulgencio Batista because he had 
believed it to be allied with US exploitation of the island and that it was incapable of carrying 
out major social reform. Castro promised that the Cuban revolution would allow all Latin 
Americans to overthrow US control and create new independent states.15 During the 
revolution, Castro utilized his anger at his country’s political incompetence and his strong 
sense of being a model for future revolutions throughout the continent to gain control of 
Cuba. 
 In 1956, Castro developed his anti-US feelings after leading a small band of 
revolutionary fighters against President Batista’s government, however he had not claimed 
to be a Marxist during the early stages of his revolution. Castro learned that throughout his 
guerrilla war against President Batista’s regime, the Cuban president had been receiving 
weapons from the United States. This solidified the US as the true enemy to his socialist 
revolution. After President Batista’s forces were defeated in 1959, the US intensified its 
policies toward Cuba. Fidel Castro had become a true communist threat right at America’s 
door step. His Cuban Revolution even attempted to signal a hemispheric plan for revolution.16 
In retaliation, the United States prohibited most exports to Cuba, cutting off the country’s 
 
13 Westad, The Global Cold War, 158. 
14 Ibid, 170. 
15 Ibid, 160. 
16 Ibid, 171.  
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economic lifeline.17 At the same time, the CIA began to train Cuban exiles in hit and run 
tactics to be implemented along the Cuban coast. Finally, during the presidency of John F. 
Kennedy, the US broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba and prepared plans for an 
invasion. Castro’s revolutionary plans were a direct threat to President Kennedy’s plans to 
reform the US-Latin American relationship.18 The success of Castro’s revolution in 1959, 
coupled with the failed US invasion in 1961, caused Castro to assert a more communist 
persona. His victories had set off a dominant leftward trend in his thinking. Castro had also 
developed a strong admiration for the Soviet Union after meeting with Soviet representatives 
in Mexico. The Cuban Communist Party would establish new proposals and plans for a new 
type of state in Cuba, based on the Soviet model. 
 To Fidel Castro, the Soviet Union represented a form of modernity that truly 
emphasized the type of social justice that he hoped to build in Cuba, however he had no plans 
to replicate all of Moscow’s models. In an effort to fight off US aggression, Castro had set 
out in 1959 to gain support from other countries, and especially from the Soviet Union.19 
Eventually, the Soviets established trade agreements with Cuba, sponsoring the Cuban 
revolution in the process as an important economic link. Soviet leadership even provided a 
deterrent against US attacks and after their meeting in 1960, Khrushchev became convinced 
that Castro was “a genuine revolutionary.”20 The decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba 
in 1962 was meant, in large part, to convince Castro that Moscow had made a strategic 
decision to defend and assist the country. However, after the missile crisis in October, the 
Soviet Union began to cool off its relationship with Cuba. This infuriated Castro and 
convinced him that Cuba needed to develop its own revolutionary strategy away from 
Moscow. The Cuban leadership’s disappointment toward the Soviet capitulation to the US 
during the missile crisis led the country to seek out new directions for its foreign policy.21 In 
his mind, Castro envisioned Cuba to be a new model for developing Third World countries. 
Supporting revolutions within these regions was seen by him as a historical necessity and a 
major defense against an American attack on Cuba.  
 
17 Westad, The Global Cold War, 170. 
18 Ibid, 171. 
19 Ibid, 172. 
20 Ibid, 174. 
21 Ibid, 175. 
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With the Soviet Union distracted by its increasingly tense relationship with China in 
the mid-1960s, Castro strived to appeal to socialist unity within developing regions around 
the globe. However, despite trying to create unity with other communist parties in Third 
World countries, Cuba faced obstacles at every turn. In particular, the Latin American 
Communist Parties rejected Cuban interreference in their countries. In response, Castro 
diverted his attention to Africa, establishing a more ideological and strategic relationship in 
the process. By aiding African liberation movements, Cuba believed it was hitting a weak 
spot of American imperialism.22 Castro’s top aid, Che Guevara, was put in charge of aiding 
foreign revolutions from 1961 onwards. He would be sent to support the communist uprising 
in Congo only to fail against the US-supported regime there. Similar to the Soviets and the 
Americans, Cuba strived to establish a political ideology of their own development that other 
Third World nations could follow. When that turned out to be unsuccessful in certain regions, 
such as in Congo and Bolivia, Cuba realized that some Third World nations were inadequate 
for their political strategies.23 Rather than its revolutionary theories, Cuba’s willingness to 
give military, medical, and educational aid would gain the most support amongst Third World 
nations around the globe. 
In contrast, Ethiopia’s communist government never desired to establish such 
ambitious socialist foreign policies. Instead, the African nation would choose to focus on 
domestic affairs while striving to maintain support from the Soviet Union. However, even 
before a communist state was established in Ethiopia, the country’s leaders had fought to 
maintain the nation’s importance within the world. Being an African country ruled by a 
domestic government for six hundred years, Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie had actively 
worked to assure the country’s importance and sovereignty during the Cold War. In 1953, 
Ethiopia signed agreements with the United States which allowed the US access to military 
bases in return for economic and military aid, establishing a special relationship that lasted 
until the 1970s.24 At the same time, the Soviet Union was determined to establish a presence 
to counter American influence within the area. It did so by creating an alliance with 
Ethiopia’s neighbor, Somalia, after the nation declared independence in 1960. The Soviets 
 
22 Westad, The Global Cold War, 177. 
23 Ibid, 179. 
24 Donna R. Jackson. Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia (North 
Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc 2007), 6. 
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maintained this alliance by providing economic and military aid to Somalia throughout the 
1960s. In response, Ethiopia turned to the US for aid against a growing Somalian threat.25 
However, the US did not want to repeat a situation similar to that of Vietnam, promising only 
a modest build-up of the Ethiopian army throughout the 1970s. Emperor Selassie desired 
more and traveled to Washington to request $450 million in military equipment.26 However, 
the Nixon administration was distracted by the developing Watergate scandal and, in turn, 
was unable to give the Emperor’s visit a great deal of attention, causing the trip to be seen as 
a failure in Ethiopia.  
When a natural disaster in the form of a drought developed in the mid-1970s, the 
Ethiopian government made the mistake of attempting to ignore the situation, giving radicals 
a reason to undermine the government’s authority. Mutinies within Ethiopia’s military in 
1974 over living conditions and pay, along with an ill-timed increase in gas prices, would 
prove to be the tipping points toward revolution. The Soviet Union’s hopes for a stronger 
presence in Africa were finally answered, when in 1974 the Ethiopian Revolution caused the 
deposition of Emperor Haile Selassie and the country to be ruled by a coalition known as the 
Derg.27 However, the Derg did not establish any foreign connections after its successful 
revolution. In 1976, one of the Derg leaders, First Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile 
Mariam, decided to secretly visit Moscow to establish a military aid agreement. This would 
consolidate a new relationship between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. When Mengistu 
seized power after having his political rivals shot, the US cut off all military aid to Ethiopia.28 
However, the US did not cut off all relations with the African country and instead choose to 
maintain limited ties with the Mengistu regime. 
With the establishment of a communist state in Ethiopia, the US slowly moved its 
military presence and influence away from the African nation. Feeling that his country would 
lose economic and military aid from the Soviet Union due to new agreements being made 
with Ethiopia, Somali leader, Siad Barre decided to establish a relationship with the US. Still, 
the Carter administration chose to limit its relationship with Somalia out of fear of repeating 
 
25 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. Rep. No. I-2563 Your Meeting with Emperor Haile Selassie at The White House. 
Memorandum for the President (May 15, 1973).  
26 David A. Korn. Ethiopia, The United States and the Soviet Union (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press 1986), 2. 
27 Korn, Ethiopia, 7. 
28 Ibid, 7. 
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another Vietnam-like situation. After being notified that the US was prepared to close its 
Kagnew station, which was a US military base in Ethiopia, Mengistu used the opportunity to 
order the immediate closure of four other major US military stations around Ethiopia. The 
American consulate in Asmara, USIS (US Information Service) offices throughout Ethiopia, 
the US Military Assistance Advisory Group Office, and the US Navy’s medical research 
center, known as NAMRU, were all ordered to close.29 The Carter administration’s stance of 
having a limited influence in Africa still remained, even as a war erupted in the Ogaden 
region between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977. US involvement in the Ogaden War remained 
at the diplomatic level. On the other hand, the Soviet Union chose to support Mengistu 
through military supplies and Cuban troops.30 On March 9th, 1978, Siad announced that all 
Somali forces would withdraw from Ethiopian territories.  
Similarly to Castro in Cuba, as Ethiopia gained victories over US influence and 
continued to gain Soviet support, Mengistu began to increasingly adopt the Marxist theorem 
in his political rhetoric. He also began to think of himself as a socialist revolutionary. In 1974 
Mengistu established a Ten-Point Program that proclaimed socialism to be Ethiopia’s chosen 
path.31 Mengistu had been a first lieutenant within the Ethiopian army, he had even been sent 
to the US for military training in 1963 at a base in Alabama. It could be argued that during 
his time in the United States, Mengistu developed an anti-US outlook after being 
discriminated against in Alabama due to his dark skin color. During his time in Fort Meade, 
Mengistu got into a bar-room brawl over a racial slur.32 After he was reprimanded, Mengistu 
left the country with a negative feeling toward American society and government.  
During his time as President of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
Mengistu established numerous policies meant to modernize the country, however none 
could stop the growing resistance to his rule. Choosing to follow the Soviet model for 
modernization, Mengistu established state ownership of industry and commercial sectors, 
created a large standing army, and set into motion sweeping social and cultural 
transformations.33 At the same time, growing resistance movements began to develop within 
 
29 Korn, Ethiopia, 28. 
30 Ibid, 31. 
31 Ibid, 111. 
32 Ibid, 109. 
33 Ibid, 155. 
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two main areas, Eritrea and Tigray. Traditionally, the Eritrean and Tigrayan rebellions had 
worked closely together and had reinforced one another. The Eritrean insurgency traced its 
origins from Italian colonization around the late 19th century to the defeat of Italian forces at 
the hands of the British in 1941. During the Cold War, the common motivation that connected 
all Eritreans together was their common hatred of governments in Addis Ababa, from 
monarchical to Marxist-Leninist, regardless of whether they allied themselves with either the 
West or the East.34 After Mengistu gained control in Ethiopia and obtained subsequent Soviet 
support, the Eritreans formed the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and gained support from a 
number of Arab states. The Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) had formed after the 
impact from the Ethiopian Revolution caused major regional dislocations. Like the Eritreans, 
the Tigrayans also favored a Muslim-controlled government. During the 1980s, the ELF and 
the TPLF insurgencies were committed to fighting the Ethiopian military, causing Mengistu 
to focus his attention to constantly defending against both groups.  
Toward the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, Ethiopia suffered through intense 
political infighting caused by insufficient government responses to key issues. As both the 
ELF and the TPLF continued their assault against Mengistu’s government, the people of 
Ethiopia began to feel ignored. Mengistu’s policies did not create the hunger or malnutrition, 
but they did make the effects of both much more difficult for the population to deal with.35 
Gorbachev’s continual Soviet aid only seemed to postpone the inevitable collapse of 
Mengistu’s government. The Ethiopian president even tried to create new economic 
agreements with Cuba and East Germany only to gain little success with either one. During 
his trip to Berlin in 1989, Mengistu’s army tried to unseat his leadership through a military 
coup.36 After surviving the coup, Mengistu still faced an economic meltdown due to further 
reductions in the prices of Ethiopian exports.  
By 1990, Mengistu had dissolved communal farming and instituted new market 
reforms as well as established that he was now ready to work with the United States. 
However, the US was not convinced and hesitated in reestablishing trade agreements with 
Ethiopia.37 Seizing its opportunity, the TPLF advanced on Addis Ababa while the ELF 
 
34 Korn, Ethiopia, 158. 
35 Westad, The Global Cold War, 361. 
36 Ibid, 390. 
37 Ibid, 392. 
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liberated almost all of Eritrea, isolating the Derg’s main army of 200,000 men in the region 
of Asmara. On May 21st, 1991, the United States agreed to facilitate Mengistu’s hasty 
removal from power to exile him in Zimbabwe, and recognized a new TPLF dominated 
federal government in Addis Ababa.38 Through the TPLF’s guidance, a new federal republic 
was established.  
 
Conclusion 
When examining the major differences between Cuba and Ethiopia’s political developments 
during the Cold War, two key factors emerged. 
Firstly, the interest in maintaining a strong communist government did not equally 
manifest in the two countries. Fidel Castro had been highly motivated to overthrow President 
Batista’s government in the 1950s, however he established a new purpose for his revolution 
only after realizing that the US was aiding his enemies and challenging his rule at every turn. 
Castro fully accepted the Marxist theorem as he had understood it to be a tool in creating 
unity amongst all Third World countries around the globe and as a tool for opposing US 
imperialism. Cuba even strived to do more for the Third World than the Soviet Union, 
challenging the communist superpower’s legitimacy to intervene in the Third World. In 
contrast, Mengistu Haile Mariam never set out to turn Ethiopia into a socialist model of 
modernity for other Third World nations to follow. Instead, Mengistu primarily wanted to 
legitimize his rule as president of Ethiopia and to establish stable trade relations with the 
Soviet Union. Although it is true that he despised the racialized aspects of US society and 
disliked major US influence within the region, Mengistu still did not fully cut off relations 
with the United States. 
Secondly, the factor of regional geography played an important role for both 
countries. Ethiopia had to deal with an immediate threat at its border from Somalia as well 
as with the threats from the TPLF and ELF insurgencies within its territories. Cuba, on the 
other hand, was an island in close proximity to the United States and Latin America. 
Although both nations faced immediate foreign threats, each nation had a different way of 
responding to enemy intimidation.  
 
38 Westad, The Global Cold War, 390. 
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Castro utilized the constant threat of US aggression to strengthen Cuba’s communist 
ideology, while Mengistu responded to growing threats by reinforcing his rule over Ethiopia. 
The failed attempts by the United States to overthrow Castro or undermine his rule only 
motivated him to intensify Cuba’s efforts in establishing itself as a socialist model of 
modernity. After the Cuban Missile Crisis ended with the Soviet Union yielding to the United 
States, Castro had lost faith that the USSR would truly support his global socialist revolution. 
This caused Cuba to take center stage in establishing new foreign relations with developing 
communist movements within Third World nations. Meanwhile in Ethiopia, Mengistu 
struggled to maintain his government’s legitimacy as he faced numerous threats all around. 
Unlike Castro, Mengistu did not want to do anything that would dissatisfy the Soviet Union, 
fearing that they would cut off military and economic aid. Mengistu also did not see Marxist 
theorem as a tool for establishing a new political ideology. Instead ,he only viewed it as a 
way to solidify his presidency and justify his totalitarian rule. The downfall of the People's 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia would come through underestimating the influence of the 
rising insurgencies, ignoring the needs of the people, and the inability to find a socialist 
common ground with the regions religiously diverse population. In the end, the main reason 
why Castro’s government continued after the Cold War, while Mengistu’s regime collapsed 
in 1991, was that Cuba had a unified society, facing a persistent adversary in the form of the 
United States. 
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